This paper sets up a model to inquire into whether the rise and fall in barter transactions in Russia and other CIS countries during the 1990's was an involuntary decision resulting from credit rationing or the consequence of firms' optimal choice. We find that t he transmission mechanism of the government policy contains the necessary information to answer the question. An inquiry into the empirics of the model is then conducted using data from Russia.
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Several possible explanations rest on real factors like soft budget constraints, tax avoidance, delay in restructuring, the virtual economy and the lock in. A traditional monetary explanation for barter is hyperinflation. Yet, a simple look at some statistics discards this explanation. Table 2 shows significant negative correlations between barter share transactions in total transactions and the money growth and inflation rates in Russia. Figure 1 (a) shows that barter in industrial sales grew in Russia from 7% of total transactions in 1992 and reached a 54% peak in August 1998, exactly one month before the collapse of the ruble in September 1998; from that date on, it declined continuously to its initial level. For the same period, Figure 1 (b) shows how real money balances decreased as government debt was steadily increasing until the end of 1998. Thus, the declining money growth and inflation rates, and the increasing real public debt suggest that a tight monetary policy affected the sha re of barter in total transactions (Commander, Dolinskaya and Mumssen 2000; Linz and Krueger 1998; Marin and Schnitzer 2002) .
Explanations based on monetary factors include liquidity shortage and credit rationing. A tight credit market makes interest rates increase; thus, if interest rates increase beyond a threshold or a credit rationing situation occurs, traders might find barter credit as alternative to cash credit to finance their operations, if barter networks are available. Traders that own financial resources may find the opportunity cost of selffinancing their operations too high and thus switch to barter. For those subject to credit rationing, barter is a Hobson's choice, and for all others it is their own choice. This paper proposes a theoretical model to ascertain whether barter has been a voluntary or involuntary decision, and tests the model using monthly data from Russia during the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . Section II presents the theoretical model and analyzes its 5 operation. Section III shows the empirical model; examines the data, shows the unit root and Granger causality tests, and uses those results and the impulse response functions to analyze the empirical results of the VAR. Section IV concludes.
II. THE MODEL
Firms. There is assumed to be a continuum [0, 1] of risk-neutral firms. At every period t, each firm has an indivisible project, which yields a real return S i R with probability q j , where j is the index of the project. If the project fails, it yields R f , which is common to all projects and can be zero. To undertake its project, each firm needs to conduct transactions for a real value of L. Consider first a firm that at the beginning of every period does not have any initial financial endowment; thus, if they want to conduct monetary transactions they have to borrow money or ask for barter credit. Lenders cannot distinguish among the quality of borrowers.
Suppose that t he firm borrows local cash at period t-1 to conduct cash transactions. Loans are of a standard debt form. The return is obtained and the loan repayment made at time t. If the project fails, the firm pays the available return f R and so its return is zero, but if it succeeds, it repays the loan at a nominal interest rate t i . Let P t be the price index at period t. At that period, the firm must also pay a real valued lumpsum tax T t . Thus, firm j's expected nominal return is
. To obtain expected real profits, we divide this expression by P t , so Suppose that firm j finances their operational cost through barter. Barter credit in the CIS countries takes the form of trade credit between firms which is repaid in goods instead of cash (Huang, Marin and Xu 2004; Marin 2005) . As in conventional trade credit transactions, in barter credit firms lend goods to other firms. Explanations for trade credit include the monitoring advantages of suppliers over banks (Schwartz and Whitcomb 1979; Biais and Gollier 1997) , suppliers' informational advantages since inputs are much less easily diverted than cash (Burkark and Ellingsen 2004) , buyers' private information about their own willingness and ability to pay and the sellers resulting incentive to price discriminate (Brennan, Maksimovic and Zechner 1988) , suppliers' private information about product quality (Smith 1987 and Lee; Stowe 1993) , and suppliers' advantage in liquidating collateral (Frank and Maksimovic 1998) . All these make trade credit, and therefore barter credit, less risky than cash credit. Yet barter credit is even less risky than traditional trade credit operations since it does not face the risk of converting illiquid assets into liquid ones. This leads to the conclusion that barter credit is much less risky than cash loans and that barter credit is much easier to enforce than cash loans. For the sake of simplicity, assume that barter credit can always be enforced.
Barter credit operations also involve the use of networks that need the employment of real resources that can be very costly. As others in the literature, assume that the real resources spent to conduct barter operations is a fixed proportion of the real value of total resources needed to undertake the project, cL. This assumption does not have any qualitative implication and can be easily relaxed by making c dependent on firm characteristics like quality and risk (Huang, Marin and Xu 2004) .
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Firms that engage in barter also have better opportunities to evade taxes (Commander and Mumssen 1999; Marin, Kaufmann and Gorochowskij 2000) . Suppose that if firm j engages into barter, it evades a share φ of its tax duties, that is, it pays
, and therefore, its expected return is
Firm j borrows cash if this allows it to obtain a higher expected return. From (1) and (2), this occurs if
A higher barter cost (c) makes the right-hand expression in (3) increase; if it is too high, it will always be greater than one, making barter credit unaffordable. This echoes the traditional literature, which considers barter so inefficient that it is always dominated by some medium of exchange. Assume that τ is small enough so that barter technology is feasible and define ( ) e t r µ as follows:
is the cutoff probability of success that makes a firm use barter credit. Let b t r denote the interest rate that makes the right-hand side in (4) equal to unity, thus 
where q is the probability for the lenders to be paid back by firms, that is,
and g(q j ) is the density function that characterizes the distribution of q j across firms. In this case, firm j obtains higher profits financing the project with its own resources if
If the interest rate increase is high enough, the inequality reverses, the firm faces a high opportunity cost and is better off if it switches to barter and lend its financial resources. If φ is high, the incentive for tax evasion is high, the inequality may break and the firm may 9 choose to barter even though the credit market is very lax. Since firms' behavior with respect to barter is the same, regardless of their use internal or external finance, for the sake of simplicity, from now on we assume that firms do not own financial resources and thus need to borrow to conduct their operations.
The Demand for Credit. Denote by f t L firms' total demand for credit. From (3) and (4) 
If b t e t r r ≤ , all firms conduct cash transactions, the integral in (7) becomes one and firms' demand for credit is constant and equal to L. However, as the interest rate surpasses b t r , firms start switching to barter credit ( )
, and the demand for cash credit decreases. Thus, from (4), (7) and the discussion above, we obtain 
This is so regardless whether this is a specialized lender or firms awarding loans.
Differentiating ( ) L E π with respect to e t r we obtain From (8) we obtain the impact of an increase in the expected real interest rate on the expected return of the cash lender. The first term on the right-hand side in (8) 
, the integral in the right-hand size of (7) becomes smaller, the second term turns negative and increases in absolute value; this reflects the deterioration in the quality and quantity of borrowers; the latter affects negatively lenders' expected profits.
turns negative, which means that the expected profit reaches a maximum at some interest rate * r .
Let l ρ denote the expected real return to an individual lender,
, and suppose that the supply of funds is an increasing function of the expected real return to an
, then the supply of funds increases with respect to e t r if and only if l ρ does it, and the credit supply curve shape is like the curve S L shown in Figure 2 . This is the typical credit supply curve that makes possible credit rationing situations (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) .
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Suppose now that the overall economy becomes riskier. Then, for a given µ, the share of firms whose projects have a probability of success equal to or less than µ increases, and so it decreases the expected real payoff that lenders receive for making loans to firms. Since the supply of funds is increasing with respect to l ρ , then S L
As the economy become riskier, the right hand side in this expression is not affected, but the integral in the left side increases; thus, the slope of the supply curve turns to positive at that point, and the new credit supply curve reaches a maximum at a higher interest rate.
Hence, the credit supply shifts from a curve like Figure 3 Credit Market Equilibrium. In a low-risk economy, we may think that most firms have a high j q . In this case, equilibrium is given by point A in . In this case, the tighter credit market leads to a credit rationing situation. Lenders will not increase the interest rate beyond r ** ; the demand for credit is at point C but lenders are willing to supply credit only up to C', so there is credit rationing by C-C'. In this case, firms engage into barter because there is no other choice for them to keep operating and thus barter is an involuntary phenomeno n.
The fourth situation shows also a credit rationing equilibrium (see Figure 5 ).
Since if r ** > r b , those firms with probability of success q i > µ(r ** ) will find barter as their best choice; for them, barter is voluntary. But, there will be some other firms that still want access to credit and will be subject to rationing. In this equilibrium, voluntary and involuntary barter coexist.
The Government. The government spends a real value g in goods and services every period. To finance that amount of real expenditure at period t, it obtains real tax revenue Therefore, the government budget constraint is ( )
If a share µ of firms borrows in the credit market, the government's tax revenue is:
where T is exogenously given. Consider the government bond market. The expected real payoff for lending to the government is
, where g q is the probability of default of government bonds. The expected payoff is an increasing function of g t r , thus the government is never rationed.
The debt overhang theory explains how the stock of government debt affects the economy: in a highly indebted country, investors may fear that the government's debt level can exceed its repayment ability and be tempted to increase taxes in order to meet its obligations ; thus, investors may be less willing to invest today lowering the expected output tomorrow (Krugman 1988; Sachs 1989 ). Frequently, the government's debt service obligations are financed by distorsionary taxes like inflation tax (Agénor and Montiel 1996) ; in these circumstances, investors generally prefer to exercise their option of waiting (Serven 1997) . Investors, thus, are most likely to undertake only projects with quick return or place their capital in safer harbor, that is, capital flights (Oks and van Wijnbergen 1995) . This makes the overall economy r iskier and creates balance of payment problems.
The theoretical literature suggests the existence of a threshold; below this level, foreign borrowing has a positive impact on investment and growth, but beyond that, its impact is adverse and the expected repayment begins to fall (Cohen 1993) . The initial empirical work of the overhang debt theory using linear approximations gives mixed results. Some of them provide strong support (Green and Villanueva 1991; Deshpande 1997; Fosu 1999; Chowdhury 2001) , and others do not (Warner 1992; Hansen 2001) .
However, recent studies strongly suggest the existence of a non-linear relationship between the stock of external debt and growth. Using a large panel data of 93 developing 14 countries for the period 1969 , Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2002 find that the average impact of external debt on per capita GDP growth is negative if its net present value level is above 160-170 percent of exports or 35-40 percent of GDP. Pattillo, Poirson and Ricci (2004) find that this negative impact operates both through a strong negative effect on physical capital accumulation and on total factor productivity growth.
The ir results are robust across different estimation methodologies and specifications.
From the previous discussion, the default risks of government's debt and private loans are increasing functions of the stock of public debt, and we can relate the interest rate for private loans and the yield from government debt using the arbitrage condition:
, defined in (6) as the probability for the lenders to be paid back by firms, is a decreasing function of the stock of public debt, and the government bonds' risk premium
is an increasing function of g t L . As the public debt is small, it has no effect on If the incentives for tax evasion (φ) or the tax base T increases, more firms switch to barter to evade taxes and total tax revenue decreases, and if the government issues more debt to offset the loss in taxes, the story of the previous paragraph repeats.
III. TESTING THE MODEL
The previous analysis suggests an empirical model to test whether barter has been a voluntary phenomenon. The model developed above involves four variables: the barter share in total transactions ( B), tax revenue (T), the interest rate ( r) and the stock of government debt (L). We use monthly data from Russia from January 1995 to March 2003. Causality from tax revenue to the barter share is taken as evidence of the tax evasion causation, and simultaneous causality from the stock of government debt on interest, and of interest on barter is taken as evidence that results from the high cost of credit ; in either case, barter is voluntary. However, direct causality from government debt to barter is taken as evidence that it results from credit rationing and thus, it is involuntary. Several mechanisms may be simultaneously at work.
Data. We measure of the real government indebtedness by deflacting nominal public debt by the price index; commercial bank claims on the general government obtained from the Russian Economic Trends is used as a proxy for the nominal public debt. The real interest rate is defined as in equation (1), the ratio between the nominal interest rate and the inflation rate. The money market rate and the increase in the CPI reported by the IFS/IMF are taken as proxies for the nominal interest and inflation rates.
The real tax revenue is measured as the ratio between the nominal tax revenue and the price index. The Federal Budget Tax Revenue, measured in rubles and reported by Russian Economic Trends, is used as a proxy for the government nominal tax revenue.
The CPI reported by the IMS/IMF is used as a proxy for the price index.
As a proxy to barter activity, we use the share of barter in total industrial sales reported by the Russian Economic Barometer. They conduct monthly panel surveys among Russian enterprise managers asking the percentage of barter in sales. The sample comprises 500 industrial and 300 agricultural firms throughout Russia. Industrial firms are located rather evenly across Russia, and agricultural firms are from over 30 out of the 80 Russian regions. In the econometric exercise below, we use the logs of the real government indebtedness, real tax revenue and share of barter transactions.
Unit Roots. To avoid the size distortion and low power problems that may occur in the traditional Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron unit root tests, we conduct the forwardreversed Dickey-Fuller regressions test (Leybourne 1995 
where ρ is the estimation of ρ. Then, it considers the reversed DF regression, that is, define z t = y T+1-t , where T is the sample size, and compute the DF t-statistic using the same expression as DF f with z t replacing y t . Let DF r denote that statistic. The Leybourne DF statistic is defined as
Critical values for the forward and reversed Dickey-Fuller regressions for this exercise are between -3.22 and -3.12 (Leybourne 1995, p. 565) . Results for both tests are shown in Table 3 . The null hypothesis of unit root is rejected for every variable and thus, we can use VAR to conduct Granger causality test and find the impulse response functions.
Both the Akaike information and the Schwartz Bayesian criteria suggest setting the number of lags to one. In addition to the l ags, regressions include an intercept and a deterministic trend, so the VAR model is:
is a column vector, 1 is a vector of ones, t is the time trend, ε is a vector of stochastic disturbances, and a, b and A are coefficient matrices of the appropriate ranks.
Estimations and Impulse Response Functions. Using (11), Table 4 shows the computed F statistics for the null hypothesis that the variable in the top row Granger causes the variable in the first column. The critical value for rejection of the null hypothesis with 95% confidence is 3.97, and 99% confidence is 6.99. Consider Table 4 , the tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that barter share Granger causes the government's tax revenue, and that the real stock of public debt Granger causes the barter share, the real amount of tax revenue and the interest rate. With 95% confidence, i t also fails to reject the null hypothesis that interest rates Granger causes the stock of public debt, but it rejects it with 99% confidence. In all other cases, the null of Granger causality is rejected. Figure 8 shows impulse response functions. A closer inquiry combining Granger causality and the impulse response highlights several important results:
1) An increase in either interest rates or tax revenues has no effect on the barter share in total transactions;
2) An increase in the real stock of public debt makes the interest rate increase;
3) An increase in the government debt has a direct effect that raises the barter share;
4) An increase in public indebtedness has an initial positive impact on tax revenue ; 5) An increase in the barter share of transactions makes the tax revenue decrease; and 6) An increase in interest rates makes the stock of public debt decrease.
Result (1) does not support tax evasion as an explanation to the rise and fall of barter transactions in Russia during the period considered, and together with (2) leads to the conclusion that barter was not firms' voluntary decision. Result (3) suggests that barter in Russia has been an involuntary decision forced by a tight credit market causing credit rationing situations. Results (4), (5) and (6) complete and enhance that story. From (4), the increase in public debt caused improves tax collection; this reflects the traditional multiplier effect found in introductory macroeconomic textbooks. From (5), the rise in barter made tax collection decrease because of the incentive that barter transactions provide for tax evasion. From (6), an increase in the interest rate discourages the issuing of public debt; this result, however, is not robust.
rationing story: increasing public indebtedness causes situations of credit rationing, forcing firms to enga ge into barter transactions, thus facilitating firms ' tax evasion.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper provides a theoretical framework to inquire into whether the rise and Table 2 .
The increasing public indebtedness created an upward pressure on interest rates that, once surpassed a certain threshold, led to the debt overhang problem. Investors, perceiving the economy as increasingly risky, required increasing risk premiums to offset the default risk of government bonds, fostering capital flights and creating balance of payment problems. The private sector also became more fragile, and the tighter policy resulted into credit rationing situations that forced firms to involuntary quit the credit market and engage in barter activities to continue operating; for them, barter was a
Hobson's choice. This explains the rise and fall of barter activity during that period.
Investors' expectations were met during the ruble crisis in 1998. In the aftermath of the crisis, the Russian government defaulted and rescheduled their payment 20 agreements restoring investors' confidence, an increasing amount of financial resources were injected into the Russian economy, the real interest rate decreased, the credit market eased and many firms returned to cash transactions. 1992 -QI 1993 -QI 1994 -QI 1995 -QI 1996 -QI 1997 -QI 1998 -QI 1999 -QI 2000 -QI 2001 -QI 2002 Response of L to One S.D. R Innovation
